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Essay Review
The Pros and Cons of "Getting to YES"
Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to YES. Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1981. Pp. 160. $10.95.
Reviewed by James J. White
Getting to YES is a puzzling book. On the one hand it offers a forceful and
persuasive criticism of much traditional negotiating behavior. It suggests a
variety of negotiating techniques that are both clever and likely to facilitate
effective negotiation. On the other hand, the authors seem to deny the
existence of a significant part of the negotiation process, and to oversimplify
or explain away many of the most troublesome problems-inherent in the art
and practice of negotiation. The book is frequently naive, occasionally self-
righteous, but often helpful.
Initially, one should understand what the book is and what it is not. It is
not a scholarly work on negotiation; it is not the kind of work that Schelling,
Eisenberg or Bartos might write.' The book is not rigorous and analytical,
rather it is anecdotal and informative. It does not add fundamentally to our
understanding of the negotiation process. Rather it points to a need for
change in our general conception of negotiation, and points out errors of
emphasis that exist in much of the thinking about negotiation.
The book's thesis is well summarized by the following passage:
Behind opposed positions lie shared and compatible interests, as well as conflicting
ones. We tend to assume that because the other side's positions are opposed to ours, their
interests must also be opposed. If we have an interest in defending ourselves, then they
must want to attack us. If we have an interest in minimizing the rent, then their interest
must be to maximize it. In many negotiations, however, a close examination of the
underlying interests will reveal the existence of many more interests that are shared or
compatible than ones that are opposed (p. 43).
This point is useful for all who teach or think about negotiation. The
tendency of those deeply involved in negotiation or its teaching is probably
to exaggerate the importance of negotiation on issues where the parties are
diametrically opposed and to ignore situations where the parties' interests
are compatible. By emphasizing that fact, and by making a clear articulation
of the importance of cooperation, imagination, and the search for alternative
solutions, the authors teach helpful lessons. The book therefore provides
worthwhile reading for every professional negotiator and will make sound
instruction for every tyro.
James J. White is Robert A. Sullivan Professor, University of Michigan Law School.
1. See Thomas C. Schelling, An Essay on Bargaining, 46 Am. Econ. Rev. 281 (1956); Melvin A.
Eisenberg, Private Ordering through Negotiation Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89
Harv. L. Rev. 637 (1976); Otomar J. Bartos, Process & Outcome of Negotiations (New York,
1974).
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Unfortunately the book's emphasis upon mutually profitable adjustment,
on the "problem solving" aspect of bargaining, is also the book's weakness.
It is a weakness because emphasis of this aspect of bargaining is done to
almost total exclusion of the other aspect of bargaining, "distributional
bargaining," where one for me is minus one for you. Schelling, Karrass and
other students of negotiation have long distinguished between that aspect of
bargaining in which modification of the parties' positions can produce
benefits for one without significant cost to the other, and on the other hand,
cases where benefits to one come only at significant cost to the other. They
have variously described the former as "exploring for mutual profitable
adjustments," 2 "the efficiency aspect of bargaining,"3 or "problem solving. ' 4
The other has been characterized as "distributional bargaining"5 or "share
bargaining."' 6 Thus some would describe a typical negotiation as one in
which the parties initially begin by cooperative or efficiency bargaining, in
which each gains something with each new adjustment without the other
losing any significant benefit. Eventually, however, one comes to bargaining
in which added benefits to one impose correspondingsignificant costs on the
other. For example, in a labor contract one might engage in cooperative
bargaining by the modification of a medical plan so that the employer could
engage a less expensive medical insurance provider, yet one that offered
improved services. Each side gains by that change from the old contract.
Ultimately parties in a labor negotiation will come to a raw economic
exchange in which additional wage dollars for the employees will be dollars
subtracted from the corporate profits, dollars that cannot be paid in
dividends to the shareholders.
One can concede the authors' thesis (that too many negotiators are
incapable of engaging in problem solving or in finding adequate options for
mutual gain), yet still maintain that the most demanding aspect of nearly
every negotiation is the distributional one in which one seeks more at the
expense of the other. My principal criticism of the book is that it seems to
overlook the ultimate hard bargaining. Had the authors stated that they were
dividing the negotiation process in two and were dealing with only part of it,
that omission would be excusable. That is not what they have done. Rather
they seem to assume that a clever negotiator can make any negotiation into
problem solving and thus completely avoid the difficult distribution of
which Karrass and Schelling speak. To my mind this is naive. By so
distorting reality, they detract from their powerful and central thesis.
Chapter 5, entitled "Insist on Objective Criteria," is a particularly naive
misperception or rejection of the guts of distributive negotiation. Here, as
elsewhere, the authors draw a stark distinction between a negotiator who
simply takes a position without explanation and sticks to it as a matter of
"will," and the negotiator who is reasonable and insists upon "objective
2. Schelling, supra note 1, at 281.
3. Id.
4. Chester L. Karrass, The Negotiating Game 66 (New York, 1970).
5. Schelling, supra note 1, at 201.
6. Id.
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criteria." Of course the world is hardly as simple as the authors suggest.
Every party who takes a position will have some rationale for that position;
every able negotiator rationalizes every position that he takes. Rarely will an
effective negotiator simply assert "X" as his price and insist that the other
party meet it.
The suggestion that one can find objective criteria (as opposed to
persuasive rationalizations) seems quite inaccurate. As Eisenberg suggests,
the distributive aspect of the negotiation often turns on the relative power of
the parties.7 One who could sell his automobile to a particular person for
$6,000 could not necessarily sell it for more than $5,000 to another person,
not because of principle, but because of the need of the seller to sell and the
differential need of the two buyers to buy. To say that there are objective
criteria that call for a $5,000 or $6,000 price, or in the case of a personal
injury suit for a million dollars or an $800,000 judgment, is to ignore the
true dynamics of the situation and to exaggerate the power of objective
criteria. Any lawyer who has been involved in a personal injury suit will
marvel at the capacity of an effective plaintiff's lawyer to appear to do what
the authors seem to think possible, namely to give the superficial appearance
of certainty and objectivity to questions that are inherently imponderable.
For example, an effective plaintiff's lawyer will sometimes fix a certain
dollar amount per week for the pain and suffering which one might suffer.
He will then multiply that amount by the number of weeks per year and the
number of years in the party's life expectancy. Thus he produces a series of
tables and columns full of "hard" numbers. These have the appearance of
objectivity, but in fact they are subjective, based (if on anything) on a
judgment about how a jury would react to the case. Every lawyer who has
ever been involved in a lawsuit in which experts have been hired by each side
will have a deep skepticism about the authors' appeal to scientific merit as a
guide in determining a fair outcome in the negotiation of any hotly disputed
problem.
In short, the authors' suggestion in Chapter 5 that one can avoid "contests
of will" and thereby eliminate the exercise of raw power is at best naive and
at worst misleading. Their suggestion that the parties look to objective
criteria to strengthen their cases is a useful technique used by every able
negotiator. Occasionally it may do what they suggest: give an obvious
answer on which all can agree. Most of the time it will do no more than give
the superficial appearance of reasonableness and honesty to one party's
position.
The authors' consideration of "dirty tricks" in negotiation suffers from
more of the same faults found in their treatment of objective criteria. At a
superficial level I find their treatment of dirty tricks to be distasteful because
it is so thoroughly self-righteous. The chapter is written as though there
were one and only one definition of appropriate negotiating -behavior
handed down by the authors.
7. Eisenberg, supra note 1, at 637, 638.
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Apart from the rather trivial concern about their self-righteousness, their
discussion is troublesome because it discloses an ignorance of, or a disregard
for, the subtleties involved in distinguishing between appropriate and
inappropriate conduct in negotiation. There is no concession to the idea that
certain forms of behavior may be acceptable within certain regional or ethnic
groups; that Jews may negotiate differently than Quakers, or city people
differently than those in the country. There is no recognition that the
setting, participants, or substance may impose a set of rules. Rather a whole
host of things labeled "dirty tricks," "deliberate deception, psychological
warfare, and positional pressure" are out of bounds. Consider their
treatment of threats:
Good negotiators rarely resort to threats. They do not need to; there are other ways to
communicate the same information. If it seems appropriate to outline the consequences of
the other side's action, suggest those that will occur independently of your will rather than
those you could choose to bring about. Warnings are much more legitimate than threats
and are not vulnerable to counter threats: "Should we fail to reach agreement, it seems
highly probable to me that the news media would insist on publishing the whole sordid
story. In a matter of this much public interest I don't see how we could legitimately
suppress information. Do you?" (p. 143).
The statement which they approve (and label as a "warning" and not a
"threat") would likely be construed as a threat. One who wishes to threaten
his opponent in a negotiation is not likely to say, "If we do not reach
agreement I will see to it that the information concerning your client
becomes public." Rather he is likely to say what the authors suggest, "In a
matter of this much public interest, I don't see how we could legitimately
suppress information, do you?" In fact the authors have suggested merely a
more subtle and more Machiavellian form of threat.
The question of deception'is dealt with in the same facile way:
Less than full disclosure is not the same as deception. Deliberate deception as to facts or
one's intentions is quite different from not fully disclosing one's present thinking. Good
faith negotiation does not require total disclosure. Perhaps the best answer to questions
such as "What is the most you would be willing to pay if you had to?" would be along the
following lines: "Let's not put ourselves under such a strong temptation to mislead. If you
think no agreement is possible, and that we may be wasting our time, perhaps we could
disclose our thinking to some trustworthy third party, who can tell us whether there is a
zone of potential agreement." In this way it is possible to behave with full candor about
information that is not being disclosed (p. 140).
The authors seem not to perceive that between "full disclosure" and
"deliberate deception" lies a continum, not a yawning chasm. They seem to
ignore the fact that in one sense the negotiator's role is at least passively to
mislead his opponent about his settling point while at the same time to
engage in ethical behavior.
Most who have engaged in significant negotiation will concede the
tension between those two responsibilities. How does one answer a question
about his authority? Can one ethically allow a bumbling opponent who has
drawn the incorrect inference about one's statement to continue in ignorance?
Assume for example that one is a skillful negotiator representing a housing
authority that is attempting to buy houses subject to condemnation. Assume
that the opposing lawyer, a person of marginal competence, concludes
incorrectly from a statement that you have made that you have been
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purchasing similar houses for $20,000, when in fact you have been paying
$60,000 for them. When he says, "Now I understand that you have been
buying similar houses for $20,000," can one remain silent? Can one make
accurate statements concerning his position in the hope that the other party
will draw incorrect inferences from those statements? "We have other offers,
and we are asking $25." The other offers are in fact at $10. Can one make the
foregoing statement in the hope that the other party will draw the inference
that the other offers are at or near $25? Each has a different point on the
continuum where he will stop. Notwithstanding superficial agreement on
generalizations among lawyers, if one stimulates open discussion about
lying and dissembling in negotiation, he will find large differences of
position among lawyers on specific cases. To suggest that drawing the line
between appropriate disclosure and inappropriate deception is easy to
mislead the reader.
Finally, because the book almost totally disregards distributive bargaining,
it necessarily ignores a large number of factors that probably have a
significant impact on the outcome of negotiations. For example, Karrass and
Ross suggest that a party's aspiration level is an important factor in
determining the outcome of a negotiation, other things being equal.8 There
is evidence that the level of the first offer, and the pace and form of
concessions all affect the outcome of negotiation, yet there is no consideration
of those matters. Doubtless the authors can be forgiven for that. No book of
163 pages can be expected to deal with every aspect of negotiation. Yet this
one suffers more than most, for implicitly if not explicitly, it seems to
suggest that it is presenting the "true method."
In his recent article Marvin Mindes 9 identifies three prominent images of
lawyers: hero, helper, and trickster. From Machiavelli onward much
classical negotiating behavior could certainly be classified as trickster
behavior, yet the trickster is the most perjorative of the various lawyer
models. In a sense Getting to YES may be regarded as a plea for the
recognition that a lawyer can be a good negotiator without deviating at all
from his role as "helper." I believe that the authors are fundamentally
mistaken about that. Anyone who would maximize his potential as a
negotiator must occasionally do things that would cause others to classify
him as a "trickster," whether he so classifies himself or not. To suggest that
the world is otherwise is to mislead the reader.
Thus the book is more elegant and urbane than those written by
Nierenberg 0 and Cohen," but at bottom it suffers from some of the same
problems. On the one hand the book promises an entirely new technique of
negotiation, but it delivers only interesting techniques and insights. On the
other hand the book delivers more than it promises in that its argument rests
on a series of inarticulated moral premises. In sum, the book is useful; it
8. Karrass, supra note 4, at 42; H. Laurence Ross, Settled Out of Court 149 (Chicago, 1970).
9. Marvin W. Mindes & Alan C. Acock, Trickster, Hero, Helper: A Report on the Lawyer
Image, 1982 Am. B.F. Research J. 177.
10. Gerald I. Nierenberg, Fundamentals of Negotiating (New York, 1973).
11. Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anything (Secaucus, N.J., 1980).
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contains interesting techniques and valid criticism of much negotiator
behavior. However, its overstatement and its facile denial of some of the
serious difficulties involved in negotiation detract from its quality.
